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1 Introduction
Local elections have conventionally been labeled second-order in academic dis-
course to denote their generally less salient features and lower stakes relative
to parliamentary and presidential elections that are most notable in the eyes of
political parties, élites and the citizenry at large (Boyd, 1981; Miller, 1988).1
Their second-order nature would be reflected in the influence of national politics,
Prime Minister’s popularity and overall country performance on local election
results, and in the lower turnout in local than in national elections. However,
based on the observation of a ‘turnout twist’ in a number of countries, with
local/regional elections exhibiting higher voter participation than state/federal
ones, recent research has explicitly acknowledged that the stakes of local elec-
tions depend on circumstances, and that those circumstances vary across lo-
calities and over time, sort of weakening the alleged universal validity of the
second-order election paradigm (Berry, 2009; Nachmias et al., 2012). Moreover,
the hypothesis of irrelevance of local elections seems at odds with a key as-
sumption of mainstream research on voting behavior and fiscal federalism based
on Downs (1957) and Oates (1970) respectively, given that local elections take
place at the level that is closest to where voters should think their votes can
make a diﬀerence (Trounstine, 2009; Clark and Krebs, 2012).2
In fact, the conventional second-order election wisdom has been challenged
in the most recent years by deeper attempts at investigating the determinants
of election stakes, focusing on the role of institutions.3 As far as the US gov-
ernment system is concerned, Tolbert et al. (2001) examine the impact of the
explosion of citizen-initiated ballot measures on electoral participation in the US
states, finding that states with frequent usage of citizen initiatives have system-
atically higher voter turnout than non-initiative states. Besley and Case (2003)
find too that turnout is higher in states where voter initiatives are allowed by
law, but warn that the result might be due to state-specific omitted variables
(e.g., political culture) that drive both initiatives and voter turnout. Hajnal and
1Reif and Schmitt (1980) first coined the term to refer to European Parliament elections.
2Based on the contrasting contribution of local governments to growth in China and Russia
respectively, though, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that the competitive benefits of
‘market preserving federalism’ (Qian and Weingast, 1997) depend on political centralization
in terms of the power of central government to appoint or dismiss local governors. Treisman
(2007) forcefully questions the conventional theoretical arguments and influential institutional
sponsorship of political decentralization.
3Fumagalli and Narciso (2012) explore the eﬀects of institutions (form of government and
electoral system) on voter turnout and policy outcomes on a cross-section of countries.
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Lewis (2003) discuss the role of a number of local institutions as determinants
of turnout in US cities, including the city manager form of government, non-
partisan elections, contracting out and other outsourcing of city services, and
Caren (2007) shows that cities having partisan primaries and no city manager
display higher turnout.
Similarly, the devolution of power from the center to the periphery and
the increasing degree of autonomy of local governments in the organization
and financing of public services in crucial policy domains constitute potentially
important drivers of turnout in local versus national elections (Blais et al.,
2011). Percival et al. (2007) find that turnout is higher in US states that spend
more on valued public programs (education, health) and impose heavier tax
burdens. Andersen et al. (2012) study how turnout in Norwegian local elections
is influenced by exogenous variation in government financial abundance. They
exploit the fact that some local governments in Norway enjoy substantial tax
revenues from hydropower generation plants located within their jurisdiction (an
exogenous circumstance largely determined by geography), and show that voter
turnout is higher in localities where the election stakes (hydropower generation
resources) are higher. Michelsen et al. (2013) use the institutional variation
in administrative structure across German municipalities to test the hypothesis
that centralized municipal decision-making - i.e., absence of community-level
self-governing institutions within a municipality - lowers the probability of a
voter being pivotal, and find that centralization of local public good provision
depresses voter turnout. Finally, noting that virtually all Western countries
became less centralized during the 1980s and 1990s, Henderson and McEwen
(2010) study voter participation in regional elections across a number of OECD
countries, and conclude that regions whose political institutions have gained
salience in terms of powers and responsibilities have recorded higher levels of
voter turnout.
As far as Europe is concerned, though, the late 2000s saw a sort of restora-
tion of the fiscal ancien régime in terms of a widespread reversion in the fiscal
decentralization process. The financial crisis and global recession constituted
powerful centripetal forces, both in terms of the weakening of EU member state
sovereignty over fiscal matters, and of the dwindling of the fiscal autonomy that
regional and local governments had progressively achieved during the 1980s and
1990s (IEB, 2013). Most EU countries severely tightened the tax and spending
autonomy of regional and local governments during the domestic fiscal con-
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solidation process, most often putting in place increasingly strong limitations
on regional and local governments’ self-financing power. In France, the fiscal
counter-reformation of the latest Sarkozy years considerably diluted the fiscal
decentralization revolution of the Mitterrand era, while the sharp increase in
Spanish regional governments’ debts during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in-
duced central government to impose quarterly budget reporting in 2011, and to
assume the right to directly intervene in regional fiscal policies in case of non-
compliance with centrally set rules. In Italy, the profound fiscal decentralization
reforms of the 1990s were followed by the imposition of strict budgeting limita-
tions on regional and local governments during the subsequent decade (Revelli,
2013).
This paper explores the consequences of the resurgence of central command
over peripheral authorities on voter turnout and on the overall functioning of the
local democratic process. Intuitively, and in line with the conventional rational
voting framework that has long been employed to investigate the determinants
of the individual decision to vote (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Feddersen, 2004),
fiscal centralization should be expected to weaken individual incentives to cast
a vote due to lower election stakes and dwindling party diﬀerentials. In ad-
dition, the doubtful possibility on the part of candidates to implement their
policy platforms once in power might as well lead political parties and interest
groups to expend little campaign and mobilization eﬀorts, thus reducing the
number of candidates running for oﬃce and reinforcing the negative eﬀect of
fiscal limitations on turnout in local elections.
In order to make that intuitive argument more precise, I rely on Ghosal and
Lockwood (2009) model of voluntary, costly voting, where ideologically biased
agents receive informative signals about commonly valued candidate compe-
tence, and I adapt it to a decentralized set-up where localities elect one of two
candidates to implement a policy that might be subject to state limitations. I
show that, by narrowing the position issue gap between candidates, fiscal cen-
tralization makes it more likely that local voting occurs according to competence
signals than to ideological views, and that such switch lowers turnout due to the
operation of two forces. First, as signals are informative and correlated across
residents in a locality, there is an incentive to free ride when the others are vot-
ing according to signals. Second, the expected benefit from voting according to
noisy signals of candidate valence is lower than when voting according to non-
stochastic private values on position issues. Finally, and in spite of the fall in
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turnout, the switch to common value voting improves the selection property of
local democratic systems by favoring success of the most valent candidates, and
in likely circumstances with a larger margin of votes than when voting occurs
according to private values.
In multi-tiered government structures, top-down fiscal restraints on local
governments would therefore, on one hand, lower the stakes and exacerbate
the parochial, second-order character of local contests, discourage voter par-
ticipation, and interfere with the voice mechanism on which local democracy
is believed to rest. On the other hand, by deemphasizing or altogether re-
moving purely ideological stances from local elections, fiscal restraints would
tend to facilitate rational voters’ party line crossing and valence-based selection
mechanisms, thus questioning one of the fundamental postulates of the fiscal
federalism lore, namely the widespread credence that tax decentralization is a
key ingredient to foster local government performance and accountability.
I next analyze empirically the fiscal hierarchy-local democracy nexus by in-
vestigating the impact of the Italian system of top-down tax and expenditure
limitations (TELs) on turnout rates and candidate competition in the elections
that were held throughout the past decade in over 7,000 Italian municipalities.
Municipal elections take place every five years, with direct election of the mayor
in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size, and display an
average turnout rate of almost 80 percent. Importantly, the election schedule
across the country is staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each
of the 2001 to 2010 years. By exploiting the unique institutional features of
the Italian system of local TELs, particularly their exogenous sources of time-
series and cross-locality variation, and by relying on local turnout in parallel
Parliamentary elections as a counterfactual, I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
research design to find that tax limits provoke a moderate fall in voter turnout
and mayoral candidate competition, some improvement in candidate valence
proxies, and a sizeable rise in elected mayors’ win margins. The evidence is
compatible with the hypothesis that, by fading the ideological stakes of local
elections, fiscal centralization favors valence-driven vote convergence via party
line crossing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the institu-
tional set up and some key features of the panel dataset on municipal elections
in Italy. Section 3 outlines a simple theoretical framework for the analysis of the
eﬀects of fiscal centralization on local democratic processes. Section 4 traces
5
back the evolution of local tax limitation rules over the 2001-2010 decade in
Italy. Section 5 reports the results from the empirical analysis of the impact
of tax limits on voter turnout and a number of other aspects of local elections.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Local elections in Italy
Elections in Italian municipalities take place every five years, with direct election
of the mayor in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size,
with larger localities (>15,000 inhabitants) having a runoﬀ stage among the two
most voted candidates if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the first stage.
Voters express a vote for a mayor candidate as well as for a councillor candidate
if they wish.4 Voting is formally mandatory for all aged above 18, though no
sanctions exist for abstainers. Importantly for the purposes of our empirical
analysis, the election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning that
several elections occurred in each of the 2001-2010 years, as shown in table 1.
The municipal level of government is highly fragmented, with average pop-
ulation size of around 7,000 inhabitants.5 As shown in table 2, the number of
cities above 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them exceed-
ing one million residents, with more than half localities having less than 3,000
residents. This means that in most municipalities a single vote can make a dif-
ference, either for the mayor candidate that is elected, or for the composition
of the municipal council. For instance, in the elections held in 2009 in the mu-
nicipality of Monte San Vito (Marche), 5,374 registered voters, the two most
voted candidates each got exactly the same number of votes (1,653), thus requir-
ing an ad hoc second round of elections. More sensationally, the city of Meda
(Lombardia), with an electorate of 18,485, had the mayor elected with a single
vote diﬀerence at the runoﬀ held in May 2012.6 Of course, such close outcomes
are rare, as shown in table 3, as they involve only a few dozen municipalities
over thousands of elections. Table 4 shows, though, that relatively narrow vote
margins are far from uncommon. Moreover, the likelihood that a vote be deci-
sive for the selection of candidates into the local councils - whose number varies
4 2
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of the council seats are assigned to the councillor candidates (frequently grouped in one
or more parties) supporting the mayor that is elected.
5Municipal governments are mainly in charge of urban public transport, road maintenance
and cleaning, waste collection and management, water and sewer services, environmental
monitoring and protection, planning and zoning.
6Ministero dell’Interno, Municipal election data (http://elezionistorico.interno.it).
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depending on population size, from 12 councillors (<3,000 inhabitants) to 60
(>1,000,000 inhabitants) - is much higher. In smaller communities, a handful
of votes can frequently be enough to gain a seat in the local council.7
In fact, the closeness of mayoral races varies considerably across elections.
Let us focus on the vote diﬀerence between the two most voted mayor candidates
that was registered in the over 14,000 municipal elections that took place across
Italy between 2001 and 2010. Figure 1 draws the log of the mayor win margin
against the log of population. Elections that are uncontested or won by a
huge margin lie close to a 45 degree frontier, while close outcomes lie in the
proximity of the horizontal axis. The fact that win margins increase with the
size of population and that close outcomes are more likely to be observed in
smaller sized localities lends support to the conjecture that the instrumental
motive to vote should be stronger in smaller communities, and could explain
the high voter turnout rate in a fragmented local government structure as the
Italian one. Turnout at municipal elections averages almost 80% and surpasses
90% in a number of regions, though it has been steadily declining over time
(table 1), a secular tendency that is common to virtually all developed countries
(Wattenberg, 2002; DeBardeleben and Pammett, 2009).
Moreover, turnout variation across Italian municipalities is substantial. Fig-
ure 2 draws the turnout rate against the log of population. A few features of
figure 2 seem noticeable, and sort of puzzling too. First, turnout reaches its
peak (above 90%) in smaller-sized localities, several of which only show what
could be seen as frictional abstention. However, turnout rates exhibit a fairly
large variance in small localities as well, and fall below 50% not too infrequently,
with a leakage of voters at around the arguably small population size of 1,000.
On the other hand, turnout rates never drop below 60% in larger (population
above 20,000) localities.
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Private versus common values in decentralized voting
Recent characterizations of voluntary and costly voting in majority rule elections
postulate individual preferences to be shaped either by private attitudes (idio-
syncratic tastes or ideology) in favor of one of the alternatives or candidates
7 In the 2001 election held in the small municipality of Bergolo (Piemonte), the mayor and
his majority of 8 (out of 12) councillors were elected with 29 (out of 68) votes. The turnout
rate was over 97%.
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(Börgers, 2004; Krasa and Polborn, 2009; Taylor and Yildirim, 2010), or by
common values (e.g., candidate competence) whose information is disseminated
across the electorate through noisy private signals (Martinelli, 2006; McMurray,
2013), or both (Groseclose, 2001; Aldashev, 2008; Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009;
Krishna and Morgan, 2011), and analyze how those inner motivations aﬀect in-
formation gathering, turnout and overall quality of collective decision-making.
A distinct, recent literature relies on common value models of political
agency where career concerned representatives allocate resources between pub-
lic good provision and rents, and studies the eﬀects of government budget size
and composition on politicians’ behavior under the assumption of plebiscitary
turnout. Besley and Smart (2007) examine the optimality of fiscal restraints
in the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) spirit in a political agency model with
moral hazard and adverse selection, and argue that constitutional restrictions
on the size of the budget favor discipline over selection, making the (pooling)
political equilibrium less informative. In Brollo et al. (2013), the hypothesis of
an exogenously determined budget size generates a perfectly fiscally centralized
environment where larger state transfers allow higher rents and attract rent-
prone, low ability candidates. Bordignon et al. (2012) argue that own finan-
cial resource-rich localities would select candidates with higher administrative
ability and attain better performances than resource-poor localities. Finally,
Gadenne (2012) shows that imperfectly observed grants to local governments
stimulate larger rent extraction than perfectly observed local tax revenues, lend-
ing support to Paler (2012) argument that it is citizens’ degree of information
rather than revenue source per se that determines government accountability
with respect to alternative (and fungible) means of financing.
In order to formalize the eﬀects of hierarchical fiscal restraints on turnout
and political competition in local elections, this section relies on Ghosal and
Lockwood (2009) model of costly voting over two alternatives, where agents
have both an ideological bias and a commonly valued state of the world, and
adapts it to a decentralized set-up where localities elect one of two candidates
to implement a policy that might be subject to state limitations. In particular,
consider a set of M municipalities, each of which is inhabited by N immobile,
adult individuals, and two mayor candidates A,B running for oﬃce in each
locality. If elected, candidate X ∈ {A,B} implements policy πXm ∈ <+ in
locality m.
Voting is voluntary and costly, with voting cost for individual i in municipal-
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ity m (cim) being independently and identically distributed on [c, c] ⊂ <+ with
probability distribution F . Turnout and voting decisions depend on individuals’
own personal bias and on candidates’ competence, the latter being a function
of the state of the world that is realized. Voter i’s payoﬀ from candidate X is:
wXim = λmu(X, τ im) + (1− λm)v(X, sm) (1)
where λm ∈ [0, 1], m = 1, ...,M , captures the weight of ideological bias (the first
component in (1)) relative to candidate competence (the second component in
(1)) in the payoﬀ function, and is allowed to vary across localities only. Each
voter i is ideologically biased towards one of the candidates X ∈ {A,B}, with:
u(X, τ im) =
½
1
0
if
τ im = X
τ im 6= X (2)
Voter’s ideological bias τ im is i.i.d. on {A,B}, with γXm ≡ Pr(τ im = X) =
0.5. As for candidate competence, sm ∈
©
sAm, sBm
ª
in (1) denotes the state of the
world, with v(A, sAm) = v(B, sBm) = 1, 0 otherwise, meaning that candidate X
delivers a positive payoﬀ in state of the world sXm. While the states of the world
sAm, sBm are ex ante equally likely, voters costlessly receive informative signals
σim ∈
©
sAm, sBm
ª
prior to voting, with: Pr(σim = sXm|sm = sXm) = q > 0.5.
With preferences defined by (1), Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) first charac-
terize the voting decision conditional on turnout, and show that there exists a
critical value bλ above (below) which all those who turn out vote according to
their private value τ im (common value signal σim), with bλ = q−0.5q , an increasing
function of the accuracy of the competence signal (Lemma 1, p. 30). As for the
turnout decision, the equilibrium turnout rate is determined by p∗ = F (BP (p∗))
if λm > bλ (voting is according to private values), where BP (p∗) = c∗ is the ex-
pected benefit of voting given that all other agents turn out with probability p∗,
and turnout is ineﬃciently high due to the same negative pivot externality as in
Börgers (2004): any individual’s vote makes it less likely that other voters are
pivotal. On the other hand, if λm < bλ (voting is according to signals), turnout
is ineﬃciently low due to a positive informational externality: since individuals
base voting decisions on their informative signals, an individual voter improves
the quality of the collective decision for the entire polity (Ghosal and Lockwood,
2009: Propositions 1-3, pp. 34-37).8
8 In Krishna and Morgan (2011), voters care about candidate’s ideology and competence,
yet ideology outweighs competence leading to purely ideological voting. In their model, if
voting is voluntary and costly, endogenous turnout adjustment restores the social optimality
of majority rule in large elections.
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3.2 Centralization
Let now local governments be subject to state limitations on their policy instru-
ment of the general form: 0 ≤ π ≤ πXm ≤ π. Voter i’s payoﬀ from candidate X
in the presence of the above limits can be expressed as:
ewXim = λmeu(X, τ im) + (1− λm)v(X, sm) (3)
eu(X, τ im) = ½ 1−4Xm4Xm if τ im = Xτ im 6= X (4)
where eu denotes the private payoﬀ function in the presence of state limitations,
and 0 ≤ 4m ≡ 4Am +4Bm ≤ 1 is the extent to which state limits narrow the
payoﬀ gap between the two candidates’ policies. Indeed, 4m > 0 requires the
limit to be binding on at least one of the candidates, and 4m = 1 results from
complete policy centralization (π = π; π < πXm; π > πXm; X = A,B).
With voter preferences given by (3) and (4), the critical value of λm above
which all those who vote do so according to private values is:9
eλm = q − 0.5q − 0.54m (5)eλm is increasing in 4m, and indeed equals 1 in case of full policy central-
ization removing any ideological cleavage among candidates (4m = 1). Conse-
quently, the more severe are state limitations on local governments, the more
likely is that voting in municipality m occurs according to signals about candi-
dates’ competence than to ideologically biased private values. This is reminis-
cent of Stokes (1963) argument - more recently formalized by Groseclose (2001)
- that deemphasizing the importance of position issues (i.e., a policy choice from
a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preferences is defined)
amplifies the moment of candidates’ talent and prestige (valence issues). In our
context, position issue deemphasization in local elections is the result of an in-
tensification of state command on local choices (fiscal centralization). Moreover,
it relies on a similar trade-oﬀ as between group loyalty and politicians’ probity
in ethnically divided societies (Banerjee and Pande, 2009; Casey, 2012), where
the strength of the influence of group identity on citizens’ political preferences
9As in Ghosal and Lockwood (2009), when an individual has τ im 6= σim and all other j 6= i
individuals are voting with their private values, payoﬀ equals λm(1−4Xm)+(1−λm)(1−q) if
she votes according to τ im, and λm46=Xm +(1−λm)q if she votes according to σim. Equating
the two payoﬀs gives (5). A similar argument applies to when all other individuals vote
according to their signals (Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009: p. 45).
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perpetuates low accountability equilibria in which people cast their votes un-
critically along ethnic lines. In our context, tighter state limitation of municipal
governments discards local party loyalty and favors common value voting.
3.3 Turnout and election outcomes
State limitation of local government fiscal autonomy can have important conse-
quences on the functioning of the decentralized democratic process in terms of
turnout, political competition, and election outcomes. As far as voter turnout
is concerned, the regime switch from voting according to private values to vot-
ing according to common values can be expected to lower turnout due to the
operation of the following two forces.10 First, as signals are informative and
correlated across residents in a locality, there is an incentive to free ride when
the others are voting according to signals: the competent candidate is going to
be elected with probability q > 0.5 relative to 0.5 when everyone votes accord-
ing to private values. Second, the benefit from voting according to the signal is
q−0.5, i.e., the extra content of information on the competent candidate in the
signal (q) relative to random selection (0.5). On the other hand, when voting
according to private values the benefit is 0.5 > q − 0.5, i.e., the private payoﬀ
from the preferred candidate (1) relative to random selection (0.5). As a result,
the turnout drop that should be expected to result from policy centralization
does not in itself constitute a symptom of a struggling decentralized democracy,
but can instead be safely interpreted as a reflection of secularized, pragmatic
polities.
In fact, the turnout drop as a result of state limitations can be conjectured
to be reinforced when relaxing the hypothesis of a fixed two-candidate race,
and allowing for an endogenously determined number of mayor candidates. If,
as in citizen-candidate models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate,
1997), the number of candidates who enter a political competition depends
negatively on the costs of running for oﬃce and positively on the benefits of
winning the election (i.e., the chance of implementing their preferred policy),
10A similar reasoning leads Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) to conclude that an increase in
the accuracy of information (an increase in q) tends to lower turnout. Relatedly, McMurray
(2013) shows that a citizen’s own information makes her more willing to vote, while the
information of her peers makes her more willing to abstain, so that voter turnout at the
macro level is determined by the distribution of expertise. Gentzkow (2006) argues instead
that television’s introduction depressed turnout in the US by substituting away from media
with more political coverage (newspapers and radio), and Gentzkow et al. (2011) find that
newspaper entry increases turnout.
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fiscal centralization reduces the latter by narrowing the admissible local policy
space. The expected utility loss from ending up in a policy corner solution
generated by fiscal limits rather then selecting the utility maximizing alternative
can be expected to lower the number of candidates in equilibrium, thus likely
magnifying the negative impact of policy centralization on turnout through voter
alienation.11
Finally, the limit-driven switch from ideological to signal voting can be ex-
pected to aﬀect the very outcomes of local elections. First, conditional on the
set of candidates and given that the competence signal q > 0.5, policy central-
ization would make election of the competent candidate more likely, and the
more so the more accurate is the signal. This is in line with recent research
on the eﬀect of political competition on policy performance, in particular with
the idea that a fall in voters’ ideological attachment and polarization leads to
more cost-eﬃcient policies (Svensson, 2005), lower equilibrium political rents
(Aldashev, 2008), better performance in the provision of local public services
(Geys et al., 2010), and creation of a growth-promoting environment (Besley et
al., 2010). Second, given that cim, τ im, and σim are mutually independent, and
that the signal is informative (q > 0.5), the expected win margin change that is
provoked by a centralization-driven switch from private value voting to signal
voting in a two-candidate race is positive if:
q > 0.5 +
¯¯
γXm − 0.5
¯¯
(6)
where γXm is the share of voters that are ideologically attached to party X
in locality m.12 A switch to competence signal voting will lead to wider win
margins the more accurate is the signal and the more evenly spread is party
attachment. Indeed, the win margin increases with common value voting in an
ideologically split electorate (γAm = γBm).
11 It has been argued, though, that an increase in the number of parties lowers the power
and willingness to vote of the electorate by calling for post-election coalition formation (Geys
and Heyndels, 2006). Relatedly, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) show that party proliferation may
reduce welfare by channeling resources into targeted transfers at the expense of general inter-
est public goods. Zhuravskaya (2007) finds that party fractionalization worsens government
quality and performance in developing countries.
12The expected win margin in a two-candidate race when voting occurs according to private
values is:
γAm − γBm
=
2γAm − 1
. When voting is according to signals, and with q > 0.5, the
expected win margin is: q − (1− q) = 2q − 1.
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4 The Italian local tax limitation system
TELs in multi-tiered government structures come in a number of forms - tax
base assessment rules, rate limits, expenditure floors and ceilings (Mullins and
Wallin, 2004) - and diﬀer depending on their genesis: in the US states, local
TELs typically originated from bottom-up, popular initiatives, while in most
other OECD countries TELs are the result of a top-down hierarchical process
(Sutherland et al., 2005; Ter-Minassian, 2007). I focus here on the Italian system
of state-determined, hierarchical limitations on municipal governments’ revenue
raising power, and exploit its changes during the past decade.
Italian municipalities’ own revenues are mainly constituted by a local prop-
erty tax and a surcharge on the national personal income tax. The latter was
introduced nationwide in 1999 as part of a wider process of fiscal decentralization
that started in 1993.13 The municipal income surcharge has since represented an
important source of revenue for municipal governments, amounting to around
1
4 of total own municipal tax revenues in the late 2000s. Since the tax base
is computed according to a comprehensive net ability to pay principle that in-
cludes income from all types of labor (employees, pensioners, self-employed, and
non-incorporated business) and from real and financial assets, the tax is due by
the vast majority of residents. Moreover, the purely proportional features of
the municipal surcharge (a flat rate that adds to the progressive rate schedule
set by the national government on an identical tax base), with no low income
exemptions, make it visible and salient to all personal income taxpayers, includ-
ing those — say, part-time workers, small businesses and pensioners — that are
only lightly burdened by the national personal income tax. The municipal in-
come surcharge is subject to nationwide rate limits (table 5). Interestingly, and
crucially for our identification strategy, those limits changed on an almost an-
nual basis during the subsequent decade, and aﬀected localities in heterogeneous
ways, in particular:
Phase 1 (1999-2002): at the time of the municipal surcharge introduction
and for the three subsequent years, a nationwide rate limit was set at 0.5% of
the income tax base, and annual municipal rate increases could not exceed 0.2%.
This implies that a municipality consistently setting the maximum allowed rates
would hit the limit of 0.5% in 2001, and be at a corner solution there in 2002.
13The local property tax was introduced in 1993, subject to state-imposed, two-sided rate
limits that remained unchanged since (0.4% and 0.7% respectively on the cadastral value of
property).
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Phase 2 (2003-2004): in an attempt to slow down local tax and spending
growth, the central government halted the fiscal autonomy of municipalities by
‘freezing’ all local surcharge rates at their existing (2002) levels for the two
subsequent years.
Phase 3 (2005-2006): following the vigorous protests of the authorities that
were stuck at a zero tax rate and were facing increasing financial troubles due
to state grant retrenchment, the central government established that municipal
surcharge rates would remain at their 2002 levels in localities with a strictly pos-
itive surcharge rate, while the authorities that had been keeping a zero surcharge
rate in the past had the freeze lifted.
Phase 4 (2007-2008): following the 2006 general elections and change of
government, the upper rate limit was elevated to 0.8%.
Phase 5 (2009-2010): in the wake of the change of government following the
2008 general elections, all municipal surcharge rates were frozen again at their
2008 level in order to curb local public sector growth.
Due to the above features, authorities held elections subject to varying de-
grees of tax autonomy during the decade. The exogenous nature of both the
schedule of municipal elections (table 1) and of the fiscal restrictions on munic-
ipal budgets (table 5) makes it possible to estimate the impact of local election
stakes as determined by tax limits on a number of features of the local demo-
cratic process.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Tax limits and turnout
I use information on over 14,000 municipal elections held during the 2001-2010
decade (at least two elections in around 7,000 localities) to investigate the eﬀect
of election salience as determined by state fiscal limitations on voter turnout.14
In order to characterize the exogenously determined ‘low stakes’ circumstances
where local authorities are bound on their revenue raising power, I build a
dummy variable TLmt that equals 1 if authority m is subject to a state-imposed
tax rate freeze in year t. As discussed above, the local income tax freeze applies
14The Italian Ministry of the Interior manages and keeps detailed records of all mu-
nicipal elections in ‘general law’ Italian regions, or around 90% of all local elections
(http://elezionistorico.interno.it), while municipal elections are autonomously ruled and ad-
ministered in ‘home rule’ regions. Data on municipal income tax rates and elections prior to
2001 are lacking or incomplete.
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to all authorities irrespective of their t−1 rates in 2003-2004 and 2009-2010, and
to authorities having positive t−1 tax rates only in 2005 and 2006.15 About 70%
of the observations have TLmt = 1, and over 14 of the municipalities experience
a switch in the TL dummy (in either direction) from one election to the next.
The voter turnout rate is defined as the ratio of actual votes cast relative
to eligible population. Since it is bound by definition between 0 and 100%, I
make a conventional log of the odds transformation of the dependent variable
in equation (7):16
ln
³
turnoutmt
1−turnoutmt
´
= βTLTLmt + fm + yt + εmt (7)
where fm absorbs all time-invariant local traits aﬀecting turnout (e.g., social
and civic capital endowment), yt controls for common influences on all elections
taking place in a given year, and εmt captures unobserved time-varying influ-
ences on turnout in locality m. The panel data set is unbalanced, both in the
sense that some municipalities record more than two elections during the decade
(due, for instance, to mayor resignation during the term of oﬃce), and because
elections occur at diﬀerent points in time (table 1). The fm terms are treated
as fixed, and equation (7) is conventionally estimated by taking deviations from
group means.
In addition to the tax freeze dummy TLmt, richer specifications of equation
(7) include the size of population among the determinants of turnout, along with
an indicator of election closeness given by the vote diﬀerence between the two
most voted mayor candidates. I have to use an ex post race closeness measure
because ex ante information on the closeness of elections is not available for
municipal elections. Finally, I include the number of candidates running for
mayor position. The latter variable might itself be aﬀected by the stakes of
elections, so that the estimated eﬀect of tax limits on turnout after controlling
for the number of mayor candidates reveals whether tax limits have a direct
eﬀect on voter turnout, or they only have a mediated one via lower political
competition.
The estimation results of equation (7) on the 2001-2010 election panel are
reported in table 6. Column (6.1) relies on a specification that only has the tax
freeze dummy (TL) and municipality and year fixed eﬀects. The subsequent
columns of table 6 report the results when allowing for the other determinants
15The tax freeze endogeneity issue is discussed in section 5.4.
16Two of the 14,561 observations in table 1 drop due to 100% turnout, leading to a final
dataset of 14,559 observations (table 6).
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of turnout. Expectedly, the number of mayor candidates has a positive and
highly significant eﬀect on turnout, while the size of population and the ex post
win margin are estimated to have little or no eﬀect on voter participation. As for
the key tax freeze dummy, it is estimated to have a significant negative eﬀect on
voter turnout. Interestingly, the eﬀect is robust to conditioning on the number
of mayor candidates. In terms of magnitude of the impact, the marginal eﬀects
of the regressors on turnout vary with the level of the dependent variable in
this model. Table 7 reports the estimated eﬀects on the dependent variable at
a number of turnout rates for the crucial TL dummy, showing that tax limits
have a moderate impact on turnout of around one percentage point.
5.2 The 2006 treatment
It might be argued that, due to universal tax freeze in a number of years, the
eﬀect of tax limits as defined above would be diﬃcult to separately identify
from unobserved statewide influences on voter turnout - due, for instance to
concomitant parliamentary, regional or European assembly elections - that have
little to do with the actual degree of local government fiscal autonomy. In order
to corroborate the evidence on the impact of tax limits on turnout, I focus here
on the 2006 tax freeze rule, and exploit the fact that a subgroup of municipal
authorities having two consecutive elections in 2001 and 2006 was ‘treated’ by
the 2006 tax limitation scheme, the rest of the authorities having elections in
2001 and 2006 serving the role of control group.17
According to the tax limitation rule in place in 2006, all authorities setting
a positive surcharge rate in 2005 had their rates frozen. In fact, this implies
that their income surcharge rates would be fixed at their 2002 level due to the
preexisting limitations in years 2003 and 2004. On the other hand, authorities
at a zero surcharge rate in 2005 had the tax freeze removed in 2006. Of the
1,133 municipalities having elections in 2001 and 2006, 794 were frozen at their
existing tax rate levels in 2006, while 339 were not. The turnout diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DiD) between the two samples can consequently be computed
as:
DiDTL = E (∆turnout|TL2006 = 1)−E (∆turnout|TL2006 = 0) (8)
Table A2 in the Appendix reports a number of characteristics of the au-
thorities in the two samples, showing that the municipalities subject to the tax
17 In the subsequent years (2007-2008), the tax freeze was lifted, to be put back in place in
2009-2010 on all authorities.
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freeze in 2006 have larger (though not significantly so) resident population, are
significantly less likely to be located in the South of Italy ( 13 versus
1
2), and
exhibit a significantly faster rate of growth of population (112 percentage points
diﬀerence), mostly reflecting the secular dynamics of South to North of Italy
migration, as well as the more recent phenomenon of foreign immigration to
aﬄuent Northern regions. Finally, the authorities in the TL=1 sample were
significantly more likely to be located in left-wing controlled regions in 2001 - a
diﬀerence that vanishes after the massive gain of votes and political take-over
of the left-wing parties in the regional elections of 2005.
While it is hard to infer whether the evolution of those characteristics might
plausibly provoke diﬀerent trends in turnout at municipal elections between the
two samples (due, say, to changing population structure), focusing on the 2001
and 2006 municipal elections oﬀers the unique opportunity to use the trajec-
tory of local turnout in the concurrent general elections as the counterfactual
turnout trends in the two samples. In fact, any diﬀerence in the trend of voter
participation between 2001 and 2006 that is unrelated to the imposition of the
local tax freeze in 2006 (say, changes in income, education, and demographic
composition of the localities) ought to be observed both in municipal and in
Parliamentary elections.
The timing of local and general elections in 2001 and 2006 is remarkably
fortunate. In the year 2001, municipal and Parliamentary elections were held
on the same day (May 13), with voters simultaneously casting a vote for mayor
and national Parliament composition.18 On the other hand, the 2006 municipal
elections were held on May 28, that is seven weeks after the general elections
(April 9, 2006), thus creating an ideal set up to identify the impact of local
election stakes on turnout in mayoral elections relative to national elections
whose stakes should in principle be orthogonal to the presence of local tax
limits.
The upper panel of table 8 reports the trend in turnout in Parliamentary
elections between 2001 and 2006 in the two samples. Turnout is high (above
80%), and even shows a mild increase from 2001 to 2006 in both samples. In-
terestingly, table 8 shows no significant diﬀerence between the two groups of
authorities as far as participation trends in national elections are concerned,
lending support to the hypothesis of parallel turnout trends.
As far as turnout at municipal elections is concerned, the lower panel of
18Once at the polls, voters could in principle abstain for either if they wished.
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table 8 shows that turnout steadily declines between the 2001 elections and the
2006 elections in both samples. This is likely attributable both to the fact that
the 2001 elections gave voters the chance of simultaneously casting a vote for
national Parliament and mayor elections, thus presumably driving up turnout in
the latter relative to what would have been in the absence of concomitant general
elections, and to the secular decline in local voter turnout referred to in section
2 above. Most interestingly, though, the decline is more pronounced in the
TL treated group. The turnout diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences equals −1.3 percentage
points, and is highly statistically significant. In terms of size, it is slightly larger
than the moderate estimated eﬀect from table 7 around the median turnout
rate in the 2006 sample (75 percent). Moreover, the estimated turnout eﬀect of
tax limits is virtually unaﬀected when controlling for the change in population
size, number of mayor candidates, election closeness (win margin) and change in
turnout at Parliamentary elections. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the
election closeness proxy has no significant impact on turnout, while population
and number of mayor candidates have significant negative and positive eﬀects
respectively.
5.3 Tax limits and political competition
As argued in section 3.3, fiscal limitations can further be expected to lessen
political competition and restrain potential candidates from running for oﬃce
by narrowing the feasible policy space and reducing the expected benefits from
appointment. As shown in figure 3, the number of mayor candidates in municipal
elections varies from 1 to 16. Around 6% of all elections held between 2001 and
2010 are uncontested, while a two-candidate is the most common race (almost
half of the elections). Two-digit figures for the number of mayoral candidates
are rare, and usually occur in larger cities.19
As above, I rely on the sharp design created by the fiscal limitation rule
change between the consecutive 2001 and 2006 elections. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀect of fiscal limitations on the number of mayor
candidates are reported in table 9: the number of candidates decreases in the
treated group and increases in the control group. State limits appear to have ex-
erted a significant negative eﬀect on the degree of competition for oﬃce, though
of relatively small magnitude (a five percent fall in the number of mayor candi-
19Roma had a record 16 mayor candidates in the 2001 elections, and 12 in the 2006 elections.
Milano had 10 mayor candidates in both 2001 and 2006.
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dates in the treated relative to the control group). Table A1 in the Appendix
shows that the declining degree of competition for oﬃce in the tax limited sam-
ple relative to the control sample is not driven by changes in population size
between the two elections.
5.4 Tax limits and valence
Finally, the crucial intuition from section 3 concerns the ability of fiscal lim-
itation arrangements that are typical of hierarchical government structures to
overcome ideological bias in lower-tiered elections: the move from private value
voting to common value voting that I have argued to be favored by tax central-
ization should be expected to facilitate rational voters’ party line crossing and
convergence towards high valence candidates.
Recent research in this area variously proxies candidates’ valence either by
their level of education (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011), or by their professional
record (Bordignon et al., 2012), or by their labor market performance in terms of
the Mincer residual from an earnings regression on individual level observables
(Besley et al., 2012). Table A3 in the Appendix reports summary information
on a number of mayors’ sociodemographic characteristics in the 2001 and 2006
elections in the treatment and control groups.20 In particular, table A3 shows
the average share of elected mayors reporting positive scores on the following
binary indicators of valence: young (age at appointment < 50), female, edu-
cated (holding a university degree or more), expert (having a specialization in
management, administration, or law), and distinguished professional status (ar-
chitects, engineers, physicians, accountants, lawyers, and academics). For the
most part, the DiD estimates in table 10 suggest that the 2001 to 2006 evolution
of the composition of elected mayors in the two samples does not diﬀer signif-
icantly along any of those dimensions, with the exception of the distinguished
professional status valence proxy, that exhibits a noticeably larger increase be-
tween 2001 and 2006 (around four percentage points) in the tax limited sample
than in the control sample.
On the other hand, based on the discussion in section 3.3 and given the dif-
ficulty of defining and measuring candidate valence objectively and accurately,
table 11 reports the results of estimation of the impact of tax limits on may-
ors’ observed win margins, a sort of indirect evidence of voters’ convergence to
20Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell’Interno, Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali :
http://amministratori.interno.it/).
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valent candidates. Using the win margin change across the 2001 and 2006 elec-
tions has the advantage of not requiring any ad hoc formulation of unobserved
candidates’ valence. To have comparable figures across municipalities, the win
margin is standardized by expressing the absolute diﬀerence in votes between
the two most voted candidates as a percentage of the votes got by the elected
mayor.21 This way, the standardized win margin lies between 0 (in case of a tie)
and 100 (in uncontested elections, or where the second most voted candidate
gets no votes, an event occurring once in the dataset), and takes a median value
of around 33 and 36 percentage points in the 2001 and 2006 elections respec-
tively. Table 11 shows that the win margin increases in the treated group and
slightly decreases in the control group. Overall, tax limits appear to favor a
strikingly large convergence of votes towards one of the candidates: where tax
limits bind, the win margin of the mayor is larger by over 5 percentage points
relative to the control group. The estimated eﬀect is robust to controlling for
the diﬀerence in the number of candidates between 2001 and 2006: table A1
in the Appendix expectedly shows that the number of mayor candidates has a
negative impact on the win margin. While an additional candidate reduces on
average the mayor’s win margin by almost 6 percentage points, still the eﬀect
of fiscal limitations remains large and significant (over 4 percentage points),
thus ruling out the possibility that higher win margins are sort of mechanically
determined by the fall in competition for oﬃce.
In fact, the two pieces of direct and indirect empirical evidence discussed
above are not reciprocally inconsistent. It turns out that distinguished profes-
sional status mayors that are elected in tax limited jurisdictions in 2006 (94
mayors) enjoy an excess win margin improvement of more than ten percentage
points (an eﬀect that is significant at the 10% level of confidence) over simi-
larly qualified mayors in the control localities. Taken together, both the direct
evidence based on mayors’ valence proxy and the indirect evidence based on
elected mayors’ actual win margins are compatible with the hypothesis of fiscal
centralization influencing election outcomes by facilitating common value voting
based on candidates’ valence signals.
5.5 Robustness analysis
Table A4 in the Appendix reports the results of a number of checks of the ro-
bustness of the above evidence. I first drop the observations in the top 5% and
21The first round outcome is considered in case the election has a run-oﬀ stage.
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bottom 5% of the 2006 voter turnout distribution (turnout rate below 57.6%
and above 87.4% respectively), and compute the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences on the
main variables of interest for the remaining 1,020 election pairs 2001-2006. This
is meant to allow for the possibility, further discussed below, that the results
be driven by unusually large shocks to voting in local elections (e.g., corruption
scandals) that could be correlated with local tax setting policy. I also experi-
ment with removing the observations in the bottom 10% distribution of turnout
changes between 2001 and 2006 (turnout fall exceeding 16 percentage points
between the two municipal elections). Similarly, in order to check whether un-
contested elections are the sole drivers of the estimated eﬀects of tax limits on the
local political process, I exclude all observations where only one candidate runs
for oﬃce in the 2006 elections (49 municipalities). Moreover, to allow for spe-
cific features of large metropolitan areas, I compute the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
after dropping the four main cities (Roma, Milano, Napoli and Torino), whose
population exceeds that of the next largest localities by an order of magni-
tude. Finally, I allow for a role from restraints on municipal expenditures.
Starting 1999 and following Italy’s adherence to the EMU Treaty and Stability
and Growth Pact (Maastricht, 1992), Italian municipal authorities have had to
abide to the rules of the so-called Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) consisting of a
set of annually determined restrictions on municipal governments’ outlays (Am-
brosanio and Bordignon, 2007).22 In order to control for the potential impact of
such EU-imposed spending restrictions on local election stakes, I build a dummy
variable EL that equals 1 if a locality’s population exceeds the threshold (3,000
inhabitants in 2006) for being liable to the DSP rules, smaller localities being
exempt from the spending restrictions. The expenditure limitation scheme is
presumed to be binding if an authority is statutorily liable to it (population
> 3, 000), capturing the idea that budgeting limits per se aﬀect the popularly
perceived ideological stakes of local elections, irrespective of the specific - and
rather hard to decipher - limitations in force. Based on the joint operation of
the tax and expenditure limitations, it turns out that 416 (of the 794 tax limited
authorities) were fully constrained in 2006 (TEL = TL × EL = 1), while no
authority was jointly tax and expenditure constrained in 2001. I compute the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for the main variables of interest as in equation (8).
22Recent research has used panel data on Italian municipalities to investigate the eﬀects of
the DSP on a number of local policies, including compliance with the very DSP rules, size of
budget deficits, spending composition and growth (Balduzzi and Grembi, 2011; Bordignon et
al., 2011; Grembi et al., 2012).
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The results of all of the above further checks are reported in table A4. Gen-
erally, they show that the eﬀects of the tax freeze on turnout, number of mayor
candidates and win margins persist, or are even reinforced, in all of those in-
stances. When allowing also for spending limitations as in the lower panel of
table A4, the estimated eﬀects are slightly larger, though of comparable magni-
tude, than when considering tax limitations alone.
Finally, and as far as exogeneity of the tax limitation criteria that I have
exploited above is concerned, it might be argued that selection of authorities
into the tax freeze sample in 2006 cannot be treated as strictly exogenous,
given that it is determined by the income tax rates that were deliberately set
by municipal governments before freezing was introduced: authorities setting
positive surcharge rates in the early years of application of the municipal income
surcharge (1999-2002) would unexpectedly suﬀer rate freezing in all subsequent
years up to 2006. Our estimate of the 2006 tax freeze impact would be biased if
the unobserved forces driving tax rates up in the early 2000s would also shape
the path of voter turnout in the subsequent years. In order to ascertain whether
an omitted variable is aﬀecting both municipal tax rates and turnout, thus
provoking a spurious correlation between the latter variable and the tax freeze
dummy, I can exploit the fact that income tax rates increased before the 2001
elections in a number localities, while in the other localities they only increased
after the elections. If in reality the shock to local tax rates also aﬀects turnout,
I would expect the turnout change 2001-2006 to diﬀer significantly between the
two groups. Of the 794 authorities facing the tax freeze in 2006, 617 had already
opted for a positive local income tax rate when the 2001 elections were held,
while 177 of them had a zero tax rate in 2001. Arguably, the latter had not
been hit by the tax rate shock yet. When allowing for a diﬀerent 2001-2006
turnout trajectory between these two groups, no significant diﬀerence emerges:
the turnout DiD between the early local income tax adopters and the latecomers
is −0.66, with a standard error of 0.56. Similarly, neither the path of the number
of candidates (−0.08, standard error = 0.09) nor of the mayors’ win margins
(−0.42, standard error = 2.75) diverge significantly in the two groups, lending
support to the hypothesis that the 2006 tax freeze did have an own impact on
election stakes that seems unlikely to be explained by earlier shocks to local
authorities’ income tax-setting policies that eventually led to rate capping.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the role of hierarchical fiscal limitations - a key deter-
minant of the actual degree of fiscal decentralization in multi-tiered government
structures - and found that they can have profound and unforeseen consequences
on the functioning of local democratic processes in terms of voter turnout, can-
didate competition and the very results of local elections. I have first employed
a model of voluntary, costly voting over two alternatives to show that fiscal
restraints on local governments deemphasize position issues and make it more
likely that voting occurs according to common values (signals about the compe-
tence of candidates) than to private values (ideological views on position issues).
Such switch should be expected to lower turnout in local elections, yet raise the
chances of success of higher valence nominees.
I have then performed an empirical analysis on a large panel dataset of
Italian municipal governments’ elections during the 2000s, a decade of varying
degree of state control on municipal governments’ budget making autonomy.
By relying on tax limit changes having heterogeneous impact on local author-
ities, the decade-long panel data analysis and the quasi-experimental evidence
exploiting the fiscal limitation treatment of municipalities in the year 2006 re-
veal that state-imposed fiscal limitations depress voter turnout and the degree
of competition among mayor candidates, while raising elected mayors’ valence
proxy and win margins. The fact that local turnout in the concurrently held
general elections exhibits no significantly diﬀerential trend in the constrained
versus unconstrained samples lends further support to the hypothesis of tax
limits being responsible for deemphasizing position issues, lowering turnout and
favoring the prevalence of valence-based voting in local elections.
On one hand, the results in this paper pay lip service to the view that hi-
erarchical fiscal limitations exacerbate the parochial, second-order character of
municipal contests, discourage voter involvement in local issues, and interfere
with the fundamental voice mechanism on which democracy is believed to rest.
On the other hand, the claim of this paper is that, by fading the ideological
stakes of local elections and favoring a switch from private value to common
value voting, fiscal restraints tend in fact to facilitate rational voters’ party line
crossing in quest of competence in government, and falling local turnout rates
can be interpreted as an innocuous reflection of secularized, pragmatic polities
in fiscally centralized government structures. More generally, explicit consider-
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ation of the position-valence dilemma in voting over hierarchically constrained
local issues questions one of the fundamental postulates of the fiscal federal-
ism lore, namely the widespread credence that decentralization of the power to
tax and spend is a key ingredient to foster local government performance and
accountability. Moreover, the implications of the position-valence mechanisms
that have been highlighted here are likely to transcend the strict fiscal federalism
context. It seems plausible that the impact of decentralization on the ideological
versus pragmatic nature of local democratic processes be further magnified in
possibly more salient and controversial policy domains.
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Descriptive statistics
Table 1 Turnout rate in Italian municipal elections
year turnout (%) obs.
2001 81.49 1,264
2002 76.60 793
2003 77.25 348
2004 79.28 4,325
2005 76.81 550
2006 74.59 1,261
2007 73.57 837
2008 78.89 459
2009 76.92 4,088
2010 73.09 636
77.50 14,561
Notes: turnout rate = votes/electorate; includes all municipalities for which information
on at least two elections is available. Source: Ministero dell’Interno, Municipal election data.
Table 2 Municipalities’ population
year <3,000 3,000-5,000 5,000-50,000 50,000-100,000 >100,000
2001 4,586 1,076 1,928 83 37
2002 4,586 1,076 1,928 83 37
2003 4,588 1,066 1,935 83 38
2004 4,581 1,040 1,966 85 38
2005 4,565 1,037 1,982 88 38
2006 4,550 1,037 1,996 88 38
2007 4,540 1,032 2,011 89 38
2008 4,524 1,027 2,026 91 39
2009 4,496 1,040 2,035 93 39
2010 4,541 1,020 2,010 93 39
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Table 3 Ties
Municipality region year votes
Valmala Piemonte 2004 28
Monteleone Rocca Doria Sardegna 2006 62
Margno Lombardia 2009 96
Cortanze Piemonte 2006 101
Aisone Piemonte 2009 101
Serravalle Langhe Piemonte 2004 121
Piazzatorre Lombardia 2004 132
Roatto Piemonte 2001 139
Vizzola Ticino Lombardia 2004 163
Cerano d’Intelvi Lombardia 2004 170
Loculi Sardegna 2001 196
Borbona Lazio 2004 196
San Giovanni in Galdo Molise 2009 241
Corrido Lombardia 2004 251
Miglierina Calabria 2004 298
Spadola Calabria 2007 300
Terravecchia Calabria 2008 314
San Nicolò Gerrei Sardegna 2005 332
Quingentole Lombardia 2004 378
Roseto Valfortore Puglia 2010 434
Scano di Montifierro Sardegna 2006 446
Cazzano di Tramigna Veneto 2004 450
Cerchiara di Calabria Calabria 2009 593
Scanno Abruzzo 2003 625
Calvagese della Riviera Lombardia 2002 706
Orsara di Puglia Puglia 2002 877
Sant’Angelo di Alife Campania 2005 878
San Benedetto dei Marsi Abruzzo 2008 968
Cannobio Piemonte 2004 1,227
Arcene Lombardia 2009 1,492
Monte San Vito Marche 2009 1,653
Notes: votes = number of valid votes got by each of the two most voted candidates.
Source: Ministero dell’Interno, Municipal election data.
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Table 4 Close contests
win margin number of elections
1 vote 46
2-5 votes 188
6-10 votes 236
11-50 votes 1,757
51-99 votes 1,625
<100 votes 3,852
Notes: Source: Ministero dell’Interno, Municipal election data.
Table 5 Municipal income surcharge rate
mean (%) limit (%) freeze
2001 0.186 0.5
2002 0.227 0.5
2003 0.229 0.5 yes
2004 0.229 0.5 yes
2005 0.232 0.5 yes♦
2006 0.233 0.5 yes♦
2007 0.320 0.8
2008 0.349 0.8
2009 0.349 0.8 yes
2010 0.348 0.8 yes
0.270
Notes: ♦ : tax rate freeze only applies to authorities setting a positive tax rate in the
previous year. Source: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze.
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Estimation results
Table 6 Panel data estimation results: tax limits and turnout
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3)
TL dummy
-0.050∗∗∗
(0.015)
-0.045∗∗∗
(0.018)
-0.045∗∗∗
(0.018)
population (,000)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
mayor candidates
0.043∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.003)
win margin
-0.001
(0.001)
year eﬀects yes yes yes
municipality eﬀects yes yes yes
observations 14,559 14,559 14,559
Notes: dependent variable = log of the odds transformation of the turnout rate; uses all
municipalities for which information on at least two elections is available. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
Table 7 Estimated eﬀects of tax limits on turnout
turnout 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
TEL dummy -1.26% -1.22% -1.06% -0.81% -0.46%
Notes: eﬀects computed from the estimated coeﬃcient on TL dummy in table 6, column
(6.1), as the diﬀerence between predicted turnout levels at TL=0 and TL=1.
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Table 8 Turnout 2001-2006: tax limitations
turnout at Parliamentary elections
2001 2006 diﬀerence observations
TL = 1 82.838 83.721 0.883 794
TL = 0 79.736 80.953 1.217 339
DiDTL
-0.334
(0.469)
turnout at municipal elections
TL = 1 82.613 75.064 -7.549 794
TL = 0 79.893 73.706 -6.187 339
DiDTL
-1.362∗∗∗
(0.427)
DiD♦TL
-1.248∗∗∗
(0.421)
observations 1,133
Notes: TL = 1: tax freeze applies in 2006; ♦ : control for population, mayor candidates,
win margin, and turnout at Parliamentary elections (table A1 in Appendix). Standard errors
in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
Table 9 Number of candidates 2001-2006: tax limitations
candidates 2001 candidates 2006 diﬀerence observations
TL = 1 2.783 2.697 -0.086 794
TL = 0 2.416 2.475 0.059 339
DiDTL
-0.145∗∗
(0.070)
DiD♦TL
-0.145∗∗
(0.070)
observations 1,133
Notes: TL = 1: tax freeze applies in 2006; ♦ : control for population (table A1 in Appen-
dix). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value <
0.10.
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Table 10 Candidate valence 2001-2006: tax limitations
DiDTL
age (< 50) -0.026
(0.038)
gender (female)
-0.024
(0.020)
education (graduate)
-0.030
(0.034)
expertise (management, administration & law)
-0.026
(0.026)
professional status (high)
0.040∗∗
(0.020)
Notes: 1,133 obs; 2001-2006 elections. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value <
0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
Table 11 Win margin 2001-2006: tax limitations
win margin 2001 win margin 2006 diﬀerence observations
TL = 1 32.408 37.165 4.757 794
TL = 0 35.194 34.512 -0.682 339
DiDTL
5.439∗∗∗
(2.091)
DiD♦TL
4.584∗∗
(2.056)
observations 1,133
Notes: TL = 1: tax freeze applies in 2006; win margin (0-100) = vote diﬀerence stan-
dardized by the number of votes of the elected mayor; ♦ : control for population and number
of mayor candidates (table A1 in Appendix). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value <
0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Appendix
Table A1 Tax limits and local elections: controls
turnout candidates win margin
table 8 table 9 table 11
population
-0.262∗∗∗
(0.091)
-0.023
(0.015)
-0.075
(0.436)
candidates
0.469∗∗∗
(0.180)
-5.899∗∗∗
(0.874)
win margin
-0.006
(0.016)
turnout
(Parliament)
0.129∗∗∗
(0.027)
observations 1,133 1,133 1,133
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value
< 0.10.
Table A2 Municipalities’ characteristics: 2001-2006
TL=1 TL=0 diﬀerence
population 2001
12,282
(102,295)
7,269
(68,478)
5,613
(6,065)
2006
13,133
(102,519)
7,541
(71,504)
5,592
(6,120)
population growth (2001-2006)
2.350
(5.437)
0.781
(5.688)
1,567∗∗∗
(0.358)
South
0.356
(0.479)
0.467
(0.499)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.031)
left-wing controlled region 2001
0.283
(0.451)
0.174
(0.380)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.028)
2006
0.739
(0.439)
0.740
(0.439)
-0.001
(0.028)
observations 794 339
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-
value < 0.10. Source: ISTAT, National Institute of Statistics; Ministero dell’Interno, Regional
election data.
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Table A3 Mayor characteristics: 2001-2006
TL=1 TL=0 diﬀerence
young 2001
0.684
(0.465)
0.664
(0.473)
0.020
(0.030)
2006
0.504
(0.500)
0.510
(0.501)
-0.006
(0.032)
female 2001
0.082
(0.274)
0.088
(0.284)
-0.006
(0.018)
2006
0.082
(0.274)
0.112
(0.316)
-0.030
(0.019)
education 2001
0.466
(0.499)
0.434
(0.496)
0.032
(0.032)
2006
0.442
(0.497)
0.440
(0.497)
0.002
(0.032)
expert (management, administration & law) 2001
0.165
(0.371)
0.130
(0.337)
0.035
(0.023)
2006
0.145
(0.352)
0.136
(0.343)
0.009
(0.023)
high professional status 2001
0.055
(0.229)
0.050
(0.219)
0.005
(0.015)
2006
0.119
(0.323)
0.074
(0.262)
0.045∗∗
(0.020)
observations 794 339
Notes: Source: Ministero dell’Interno, Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table A4 Robustness analysis: 2001-2006
turnout candidates win margin observations
removing bottom 5% and top 5% turnout rates (2006)
DiDTL
-1.423∗∗∗
(0.437)
-0.153∗∗
(0.076)
4.956∗∗
(2.143)
1020
removing bottom 10% turnout rate changes (2001-2006)
DiDTL
-1.276∗∗∗
(0.349)
-0.145∗∗
(0.073)
5.394∗∗∗
(2.168)
1020
removing uncontested elections (2006)
DiDTL
-1.452∗∗∗
(0.418)
-0.166∗∗
(0.071)
6.453∗∗∗
(2.044)
1084
removing 4 largest cities
DiDTL
-1.389∗∗∗
(0.427)
-0.138∗∗
(0.070)
5.202∗∗∗
(2.093)
1129
tax and expenditure limitations
DiDTEL
-1.622∗∗∗
(0.404)
-0.184∗∗∗
(0.066)
5.384∗∗∗
(1.986)
1133
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗: p-value < 0.01; ∗∗: p-value < 0.05; ∗: p-value
< 0.10.
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Figure 1: Win margin
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Figure 3: Mayor candidates
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